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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
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1 OF 1

**Confidential**



# TRENDS

*in Communist Propaganda*

**Confidential**

2 FEBRUARY 1972  
(VOL. XXIII, NO. 5)

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## TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 24 - 30 JANUARY 1972

Moscow (3064 items)

Warsaw Pact PCC Meeting	(--)	23%
[European Security Declaration	(--)	3%]
[Indochina Statement	(--)	3%]
[Communique	(--)	2%]
Gromyko Visit to Japan	(2%)	6%
Indochina	(8%)	4%
[Nixon 25 January Address	(--)	2%]
Soviet Recognition of Bangladesh	(--)	4%
22d Anniversary of Indian Republic	(--)	4%
China	(7%)	4%

Peking (1357 items)

Domestic Issues	(39%)	36%
Indochina	(22%)	23%
[Nixon 25 January Address	(--)	8%]
[Cambodia	(3%)	5%]
Nixon State of Union, Budget Messages	(--)	9%
UN Security Council Special Session in Africa	(5%)	7%
PEOPLE'S DAILY on Dalai Lama in India	(--)	4%
Kim Il-song Interview	(2%)	3%
Nixon-Sato Talks	(--)	2%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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## INDOCHINA

The U.S. eight-point peace plan, which the allies presented at the 27 January Paris session after the President in his speech on the 25th revealed that it had been secretly submitted to the DRV last fall, has been uniformly scorned by the Vietnamese communists as merely a device to continue the Vietnamization policy. While Hanoi commented on the speech within a few hours of its delivery, it was slow to acknowledge the details of the President's disclosures about the series of U.S.-DRV private meetings. Not until the 31st did Hanoi supply its version of what had caused the breakdown of the talks last fall and confirm that it had submitted a nine-point peace proposal privately to the United States on 26 June, five days before the PRG presented its seven-point plan at Paris.

The propaganda has evolved in a fashion reflecting concern to return the PRG to the forefront of the negotiations. Hanoi has been at pains in its discussion of the private talks to stress that they were undertaken with the PRG's full approval. The PRG, for its part, practically ignored the President's speech and the U.S. peace plan until 2 February, when it issued a government statement "elaborating" on its 1 July seven-point proposal. No comparable statement from the DRV has been issued at this writing. But DRV Premier Pham Van Dong, speaking at a banquet for a visiting Hungarian delegation on the 2d, said that the DRV Government and people "warmly welcome" the PRG statement, which "condemned in a well-founded and forceful manner" the U.S. "war of aggression" and Vietnamization. The last previous U.S. peace proposal, that of 7 October 1970, had prompted a DRV Foreign Ministry statement followed by a statement by PRG President Huynh Tan Phat.

Reacting to the President's peace proposal as an attempt to impose "truculent and unreasonable conditions" for a U.S. troop withdrawal, Peking has denounced the plan as "a new strategem" for prolonging the war and expressed concern over a possible intensification of hostilities in Indochina. Both a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on 29 January and Chou En-lai on 2 February reaffirmed Chinese support for the PRG's seven-point plan and for the Vietnamese communists' war effort. Though PRC media have acknowledged the DRV-U.S. secret meetings and carried the relevant documents, Peking has not commented on the DRV's nine points or the secret talks.

## U.S. PEACE PLAN ASSAILED BY DRV PROPAGANDA, PRG STATEMENT

The Vietnamese communists reacted to President Nixon's speech in a fashion which suggested some embarrassment and confusion over the

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President's disclosure that the DRV had been negotiating privately without its PRG allies. The initial 26 January Hanoi radio commentary on the speech ignored that disclosure, and both the DRV Paris spokesman's statement that day and DRV delegate Xuan Thuy at the Paris session on the 27th referred only vaguely to "private" meetings. There were no references to private meetings at all in PRG representative Nguyen Van Tien's statement at the Paris session or in the PRG spokesman's statement on the President's speech. The PRG spokesman did say that in an attempt to deceive public opinion the President "has pretended" that his government has made efforts to seek peace. The PRG's only other propaganda on the U.S. peace plan prior to its government statement was a LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY commentary which largely paraphrased the initial Hanoi radio commentary and said nothing about private contacts.

Despite the rapid reaction to the President's speech by Hanoi radio and the fact that Xuan Thuy did some probing regarding the eight points at the Paris session on the 27th, DRV press reaction came only belatedly on the 29th in an article signed by Commentator in the party daily NHAN DAN--Hanoi's standard vehicle for responding to Presidential pronouncements. There was even greater delay in comment in the army organ QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, with a Commentator article published in that paper on the 31st. Both articles were sharply critical of the President for having unilaterally revealed information on the secret talks, and both questioned his motives and ridiculed his sincerity regarding a political settlement. But both were notable for the absence of the sharp personal abuse that is a normal staple of Hanoi propaganda; abusive epithets had appeared as recently as 23 January in articles in both NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN pegged to the State of the Union message. Hanoi presumably felt that a personal attack now would be inconsistent with the acknowledgment that secret talks had been going on with the President's emissary.

NHAN DAN's Commentator repeated the line--used by Hanoi in the past--that the DRV "holds that what matters is to reach a correct settlement, not the form of the meeting, public or private." It added that "with good will and the full approval of the PRG," the DRV delegation has held meetings with the United States.

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PRG'S 'ELABORATION'  
OF SEVEN-POINT PLAN

Both the PRG and DRV delegates at the Paris session on the 27th, in assailing the allied eight-point proposal, repeated the elaborated version of the first two points of the 1 July PRG proposal which have appeared frequently since Pham Van Dong first spelled them out on 20 November in a speech in Peking: that U.S. withdrawal and cessation of aggression must include an end to all military action in both parts of Vietnam; and that regarding a political solution in South Vietnam, the United States must give up all support and "commitments" to the Thieu regime.

The PRG statement of 2 February\* now adds some new variations. After referring to the DRV's nine points as well as the PRG's seven points as evidence of the communists' "reasonable" negotiating posture, the statement asserts a wish to elaborate on the two key points in the seven-point plan "aimed at stopping the U.S. war of aggression and putting a complete end to the Vietnamization policy." Reviewing point one largely in terms of Dong's formulation, the statement also includes the demand that "the U.S. Government must set a specific terminal date for the complete withdrawal from South Vietnam of all U.S. troops, advisers, military personnel, weapons and war materials and those of other foreign countries in the U.S. camp without posing any conditions." The original 1 July proposal had demanded that a terminal date be set only for "the total withdrawal of U.S. forces and those of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp." The statement goes on to say that this specific terminal date will also be the date for the release of all military men and of the civilians captured in the war. Dong's formulation had not mentioned the setting of a terminal date or the POW issue.

In "elaborating" on point two, the statement says more dramatically that Thieu "must resign immediately." It adds that "the Saigon administration must end its warlike policy, disband at once its machine of oppression and constraint against the people and stop its pacification policy . . . ." The statement then goes on to say that the PRG will discuss with "the Saigon administration" the formation of a three-segment government of national concord. But unlike the 1 July proposal, it fails to discuss the formation of

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\* The statement was first monitored from a Liberation Radio broadcast in Vietnamese at 1000 GMT on the 2d and subsequently from LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY in English. A Hanoi radio domestic service broadcast at 1115 GMT reported that the PRG statement had been released in Hanoi at a press conference held by the special PRG representation.

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this new Saigon administration. The July proposal said "political, social and religious forces . . . will use various means to form a new Saigon administration."

PRG "DOES NOT ACCEPT" The statement echoes earlier Hanoi  
EIGHT-POINT PROPOSAL propaganda when it says that the eight-point plan is merely a plan to continue Vietnamization and pursue neocolonialism and that the President is concerned to "deceive public opinion" because of the coming U.S. elections. It then says bluntly: "The Provisional Revolutionary Government declares it does not accept this deceitful peace plan of the Nixon Administration."

The statement also echoes other propaganda when it observes that President Nixon has "brazenly betrayed" his election promise to bring the war to an early end. It claims that his statement about readiness to withdraw all forces within six months of an agreement without setting any specific terminal date is designed to maintain indefinitely the occupation of South Vietnam by some U.S. forces. And it charges that the President is attempting to "negate the PRG" and force the "stooge" administration on the Vietnamese with "his trick of Thieu and Huong handing in their resignations but holding elections within the framework of that stooge administration."

Xuan Thuy at the Paris session on the 27th engaged in some probing of aspects of the eight points, though he prefaced his remarks by claiming that the eight-point plan is merely aimed at putting up a smokescreen of false peace to serve the electoral campaign in the United States while continuing Vietnamization and intensifying and expanding the war. Regarding withdrawal six months after an agreement, Thuy asked: "When, then, does this agreement take place and when will the withdrawal be completed?" And he complained that the eight points do not deal specifically with what these forces are, "whether the United States will withdraw all its troops, advisers, military personnel, weapons and war means, whether it will dismantle U.S. military bases and whether it will stop the use of the air force and the navy to strike at both zones in Vietnam." Thuy said it should be recalled that the President himself in recent statements has affirmed that the United States would leave a residual force in South Vietnam indefinitely and would also continue to use the air force. The VNA account reflects much of the substance of Thuy's statement, and Hanoi

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radio broadcast the full text.\* The VNA account, typically, includes none of the substance of the allied remarks and thus does not acknowledge Ambassador Porter's statements of clarification. The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 31st distorted Porter's remarks when it claimed that "while elaborating on the troop withdrawal proposal, Ambassador Porter at the 27 January Paris session bluntly said: 'no provisions therein deal with military personnel and equipment or with the use of military bases in South Vietnam.'" (In remarks at the session in addition to his formal statement, Ambassador Porter said that "concerning which forces are to be withdrawn, our proposal contains a provision for total withdrawal. Total is not a word which requires much explanation. There is no provision for military personnel, military equipment, or the use of bases in South Vietnam after that withdrawal is complete.)

PRG delegate Tien did not get into the detail that Thuy did, but in his formal statement he said "Mr. Nixon tried to lead public opinion to believe that he has set a deadline for the complete troop withdrawal." Tien also observed that the President, immediately after saying Thieu would resign a month before presidential elections in South Vietnam, went on to say that "the only thing that this plan does not do is overthrow our allies."

The Hanoi press comment, like the remarks by the delegates at Paris and the PRG statement, also focused on the two points in the U.S. proposal on troop withdrawal and a settlement in South Vietnam. As evidence that the President has not stilled his critics, NHAN DAN quoted Congressman McCloskey as criticizing the U.S. proposal for presidential elections in South Vietnam six months after an agreement is reached. McCloskey was quoted as asking: "How could free elections be possible in South Vietnam when the police there were dedicated to the elimination of the NFLSV infrastructure in the 'Phoenix' program? This factor makes it impossible to consider free and full elections going forward." NHAN DAN went on to ask whether there is anything new in President Nixon's proposal compared with the six points set forth by

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\* Vietnamese communist media also carried the full text of the DRV delegate's statements at Paris, as well as those of the PRG, at the sessions of 8 May 1969, 17 September 1970, and 1 July 1971 when PRG proposals were formally introduced.

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Thieu in July 1969.\* Some of the other comment mentioned the POW release and cease-fire. And NHAN DAN made a passing reference to aid to Indochina, without acknowledging that while the President mentioned it in his speech, it is not included among the eight points.

DRV Premier Pham Van Dong assailed the President's 25 January speech in the course of his address on 2 February at a banquet for the visiting Hungarian delegation, but judging from the VNA report he did not mention the "U.S. eight-point plan. Asserting Vietnamese resolve to continue the struggle against the "U.S. imperialists' extremely brutal, colonial war," Dong said:

But the chiefs of the White House and the Pentagon have not given up their dark designs in Vietnam and Indochina. They are embarking on new and very dangerous military and political adventures: air attacks on many places of the DRV, attempts of sabotage against the Paris talks, and more particularly the speech of President Nixon on January 25, which reveals most clearly the obdurate and bellicose nature of the U.S. imperialists and their scheme of pursuing the war of aggression in Vietnam through the policy of 'Vietnamization' of the war. Now it is more necessary than ever that the Vietnamese people denounce more strongly the policy of 'Vietnamization' of the war, condemn it with still more vehemence, combat it and bring it to failure.

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\* Propaganda on Thieu's 11 July 1969 election proposal--in which he said the NFLSV could participate in elections if it renounced violence and pledged to recognize the election results and proposed that the NFLSV be one of the members of the electoral committee--is discussed in the TRENDS of 16 July 1969, pages 2-5.

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## PATHET LAO LIKENS U.S. PLAN TO PAST "SHOPWORN" PROPOSALS

The Pathet Lao has reacted with routine-level radio and press agency comment and thus far has issued no official statement. The first reaction, a 27 January Pathet Lao radio commentary, a shorter version of which was disseminated by the Pathet Lao news agency on the 30th, said that the President's plan is "no different" from past "shopworn proposals" and is "full of warmongering, obstinate, and arrogant statements." It observed that the publicity for the plan was aimed at countering the Democratic Party's criticisms of the President's "crimes" in Indochina, and it added that the President hopes to use the "Vietnam issue" to defeat the Democrats in the forthcoming presidential elections.

Scoring President Nixon as a "warmongering and cunning person," the commentary seemed to exhibit concern that "one might be misled into believing his propaganda." It took issue specifically with the points on U.S. troop withdrawal and exchange of prisoners, the cease-fire throughout Indochina, and the South Vietnamese election. Complaining that the cease-fire proposal is surrounded by numerous conditions for the total withdrawal of troops, it scored President Nixon's "threats" that he will maintain troops in South Vietnam and continue the bombing of the DRV and it decried the continued stationing of army and air forces in other Indochinese countries and Thailand.

The commentary also asked how a just election can be held in South Vietnam under these conditions and while Thieu's "lackeys from the top down to the local levels are still in power." The Pathet Lao commentary did not mention the points on respect for the Geneva agreements or on international guarantees and an international conference. It concluded by insisting that peace can be achieved in the Indochinese countries through the PRG's seven points, the NLHS' five points, and Sihanouk's "various peace solutions," and that to restore peace President Nixon does not have to make any more proposals: "He can discuss any problems at the Paris talks." The commentary did not acknowledge the disclosure of the secret DRV-U.S. talks.

A 30 January weekly "conversation" broadcast by Pathet Lao radio was at pains to emphasize that the eight-point proposal is nothing new and that four of the points "may have misled some people." It took issue with the points on U.S. troop

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withdrawal and prisoner exchange, the cease-fire, and the South Vietnam elections in terms similar to the first commentary, and it dismissed the other points as "no different from previous proposals"--again avoiding mention of the Geneva agreements, international guarantees, and an international conference. It concluded with the assertion that the Pathet Lao will continue to adhere to its five-point proposal and will continue its military defeats of the "puppet troops" in Laos. "The only way to bring peace and independence to our country," it declared, "is to fight and defeat the enemy."

A 2 February Pathet Lao news agency commentary on the DRV's disclosure of its nine-point plan singled out the points demanding that the United States respect the 1954 and 1962 Geneva agreements and that the problems existing among the Indochinese countries be settled by the Indochinese parties on the basis of mutual respect for independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and noninterference. The commentary said this stand is in accord with the joint declaration of the Indochinese peoples' summit conference, with various joint communiques signed by the Indochinese leaders, and with the NLHS' stand on settlement of the Laotian question.

### SIHANOUK'S "GOVERNMENT" ASSAILS NIXON PLAN FOR "SHAM PEACE"

A 28 January statement by the Information and Propaganda Ministry of Sihanouk's Royal Government of National Union (RGNU), broadcast by the radio of Sihanouk's front, the FUNK, on the 31st, denounced the speech by "international gangster Nixon" as aimed at "a sham Indochina peace in order to continue U.S. imperialist aggression and its colonialist yoke in Indochina."

The statement commented specifically only on the proposals on a cease-fire and elections in South Vietnam and on the U.S. undertaking to remain neutral in the elections. The points on the cease-fire and the elections, it said, were merely an effort to "gain time" to improve the situation of the U.S. "puppet" regimes in Indochina. As for U.S. neutrality in the elections, the statement observed that the United States has never been neutral in Cambodia since the days of John Foster Dulles and the 1954 Geneva conference. That agreement, which indicated that no big power should interfere in Indochina, has been "trampled" by the United States, the statement said. It did not directly acknowledge the points in the President's statement regarding respect for the Geneva agreements and international guarantees and an international conference.

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The RGNU statement accused the President of repeating the "tricks" he had used in the 1968 election to prolong "aggression" in Indochina for another four years. He publicized the peace plan, it said, because the United States and its "lackeys" are being "heavily defeated" in Indochina, "especially in Cambodia," and in the hope that he could strengthen the position of the "puppet" regimes and at the same time continue his "reactionary rule" over the American people. The RGNU went on to charge President Nixon with attempting to mislead world opinion by "exerting pressure" on Washington's "henchmen"--pressure that is especially obvious in Phnom Penh, where Ambassador Swank "makes everything available" to the "clique" and where he "ordered" Minister of Information Long Boret to make a statement supporting the President's speech. The statement concluded with a pledge to launch "greater offensives" in the military, political, economic, and diplomatic fields, force the United States and its "lackeys" to withdraw from Cambodia, and "crush" the "clique" in Phnom Penh.

A brief statement by Sihanouk reported by AKI, the press agency of Sihanouk's government and front, on the 31st said the U.S. proposals have been "unanimously" rejected by the DRV, PRG, RGNU, and NLHS. Complaining that they are not aimed at ending the Indochina war, he specified that there is "no satisfactory provision" concerning the air raids; that Thailand will continue as a base for attacks on Indochina; and that President Nixon reserves the possibility of insuring the survival of the Indochinese "renegade" regimes. (AFP on the 27th reported that Sihanouk told its Peking correspondent he was "shocked" that President Nixon seems to be addressing only the Vietnamese when he talks about Cambodia and all of Indochina. Stressing that the President cannot settle the problem of Cambodia with Hanoi or Peking, he reportedly insisted that solutions must be reached with the Indochinese countries individually.)

#### PEKING SAYS NIXON PROPOSAL IMPOSES "TRUCULENT" CONDITIONS

Denouncing President Nixon's eight-point peace plan as an attempt to impose "truculent and unreasonable conditions" for a troop withdrawal, Peking has deplored the President's "war blackmail" and has expressed concern over an exacerbation of the situation in Vietnam as the time for the President's trip to the PRC nears. Peking has also offered high-level reassurance of its support both for the PRG's seven-point plan and for the Vietnamese communists' war effort.

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A 29 January PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article and a companion NCNA commentary dated the 28th dismissed the President's 25 January proposal as "a new strategem" for "prolonging and intensifying" the war through the Vietnamization program. Beginning on the 27th, Peking had first acknowledged the proposal by carrying the 25 January statements by the DRV and PRG Paris delegations and other foreign comment. Peking's reaction to the President's previous major peace plan, delivered on 7 October 1970, took a similar form of publicity for critical foreign reaction followed by Chinese comment on the level of a Commentator article.

On 2 February Chou En-lai, receiving the PRG and DRV envoys in Peking for "a very cordial and friendly conversation," reiterated support for the PRG's seven points and asserted that the Chinese "resolutely support the Vietnamese people" in their war against the United States until "complete victory." According to NCNA's account, the two envoys informed Chou of "the solemn and just stand" of their governments regarding the U.S. eight-point proposal, "exposed the deceptive essence" of the proposal, and expressed "the militant determination of the Vietnamese people" in their war. There was no mention of the DRV's nine-point plan.

In Peking's first acknowledgment of the DRV plan and of the secret DRV-U.S. talks, the NCNA domestic service on 2 February carried the texts of the DRV delegation's 31 January communique discussing the secret meetings, the DRV's nine-point plan, both versions of the U.S. eight points, and the exchange of messages on the cancelation of the 20 November private meeting. A Peking domestic radio broadcast carrying the communique also noted that PEOPLE'S DAILY published the communique on 2 February. NCNA's English-language international service on the 2d carried--in French--all the DRV and U.S. documents. However, in line with Hanoi's apparent effort to return the PRG to the negotiating forefront, Peking has ignored the DRV plan and the secret meetings in its comment while reaffirming support for the PRG's peace plan.

COMMENT ON U.S. PLAN      The 29 January PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article interpreted the President's eight-point proposal as offering a U.S. troop withdrawal "on condition" that the POW's be released, the Saigon "puppet regime" be maintained, and a cease-fire be realized, which "means that the Indochinese people have to lay down their arms and stop their war." Both the Commentator article and NCNA came down hard on the issue of conditions for a troop withdrawal, declaring that the United States has no right to impose any conditions. As for

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the election proposal, Commentator argued that the result of such an election could only be the same as "the fake election" held in South Vietnam last October and that the United States is trying to impose "a puppet regime" on the South Vietnamese. The NCNA commentary added the complaint that the President's proposal on an election made no mention of the PRG.

According to the PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator, the President's eight-point proposal means that he actually wants to pursue his Vietnamization plan. Explaining the timing of the proposal, Commentator said the President offered the plan in order to deceive the American people and world opinion at a time when the United States has suffered heavy defeat on the battlefield and has encountered strong opposition at home and abroad. NCNA made the additional point that the United States has been "exposed repeatedly at the conference table" and that the President's proposal reflects the bankruptcy of the U.S. "counterrevolutionary dual tactics."

The NCNA commentary, but not the Commentator article, took note of the references to the Geneva agreements in the President's proposal. Repeating Peking's standard formulation, NCNA claimed that the Geneva agreements "have long been torn to pieces" by the United States. There was no reference by either NCNA or the PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator to the President's proposals on an international guarantee and an international conference on peace in Indochina--matters on which Peking presumably would not wish to move ahead of its Indochinese allies.

According to the PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator, the PRC Government and people firmly support the PRG's seven-point proposal as "the correct way" to solve the Vietnam question. Taking Peking's standard line, Commentator said the Vietnam and Indochina questions can only be settled by their peoples themselves. Commentator expressed confidence that the Vietnamese people, uniting and fighting shoulder to shoulder with the Laotians and Cambodians, will certainly achieve victory. A similar prescription in the 13 October 1970 PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on the President's Indochinese proposal that month had included a call for the Indochinese to persist in "protracted people's war," a formula that dropped out of Chinese propaganda after Peking judged the situation in Indochina to be "unprecedentedly fine" following the Lam Son 719 operation.

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Concern over a possible deterioration of the situation seems reflected in a passage in the NCNA commentary containing the sharpest retort to President Nixon's proposal and the most direct reference to Chinese interests. Taking exception to the President's statement that he would take action to protect the remaining American forces if the enemy responded to his peace proposal by stepping up military attacks, NCNA accused the President of "naked war blackmail and intimidation" against the Vietnamese. Reiterating Chinese determination to support the Vietnamese in a fight to the end, NCNA claimed that the "war blackmail of U.S. imperialism" is a "provocation" not only against the Indochinese peoples but also against the Chinese. This represents the first such charge by Peking since the time of Lam Son 719 last winter. The more authoritative Commentator article did not, however, contain the charge of a provocation against the Chinese in referring more vaguely to U.S. "military blackmail."

Concern over an intensification of hostilities in Indochina--squeezing Peking between its commitment to its Vietnamese allies and its desire to improve relations with the United States--is one of the aspects of its reaction to the President's proposal that seem related to his impending visit to the PRC. In addition to increased fighting in Indochina around the time of the visit, another possible source of embarrassment to the Chinese may be speculation over the timing of the President's initiatives. Thus, unlike Hanoi and in contrast to its own reaction to the President's October 1970 peace plan, Peking has not cited this year's U.S. elections as a factor in the timing of the President's proposal--a reticence suggesting sensitivity to speculation linking the President's Vietnam proposal and his China trip to the electoral campaign.

In keeping with its treatment of the President since plans got underway for his visit, Peking's reaction to his Vietnam peace proposal has avoided personal abuse. This circumspection was evident even in Peking's account of a harsh Albanian denunciation of the President: NCNA sanitized an Albanian article to delete references to the "blood-stained hands" of "the chieftain of U.S. imperialism." The 13 October 1970 PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on the President's peace plan that month called "the chieftain of U.S. imperialism" a "god of plague of war," a characterization that was discreetly dropped as Sino-U.S. relations improved last year.

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## MOSCOW FOLLOWS HANOI'S LEAD IN CRITICIZING U.S. PROPOSAL

After having cautiously waited until the Vietnamese communist reaction to the President's 25 January address was on record before commenting on its own authority, Moscow has followed with press and radio commentary supporting its Vietnamese allies and criticizing the President's initiative as an election-year maneuver. In addition to its somewhat belated reaction time,\* Moscow's deference to Hanoi's lead was also reflected in a dispatch from Hanoi, published in PRAVDA on 28 January, which said that "outwardly these proposals might seem to be something new" but that in "Hanoi political circles their real content is being thoroughly analyzed and that which is concealed behind this new cover is being noted." Similarly, a panelist on Radio Moscow's domestic service roundtable program on the 30th said the proposals are "crafty" but are "being carefully studied by our Vietnamese comrades."

While responding in critical terms to the provisions in the President's plan relating to troop withdrawal and prisoner exchange, the holding of an election in South Vietnam, and a cease-fire throughout Indochina, Moscow has ignored the points regarding international guarantees and an international conference on Indochina. There has, however, been a passing reference to the provision on international supervision of the proposed election. IZVESTIYA's Matveyev, in the course of an attack on the President for intending to preserve the "pro-U.S. puppet regime," observed that although the proposal "speaks hazily" about international supervision of the election it would still be the Thieu regime that would prepare the election, U.S. troops would remain, and the Saigon army would continue to implement Vietnamization, thus resulting in an election "at the point of guns."

In seeking to denigrate the President's initiative by linking it to the U.S. election, Moscow has played up critical remarks by Democratic presidential candidates and other congressmen. A Washington-dated dispatch in PRAVDA on the 28th reported that the President's speech "is being assessed" as an election-year move to pull the rug out from under his political opponents and that the President hopes to stifle criticism of his Vietnam policies.

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\* See the TRENDS of 26 January, page 3.

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SECRET TALKS        Moscow was the first communist source to mention the secret talks and the DRV's nine-point plan. A TASS dispatch on 27 January reporting that day's post-session press conference in Paris by Nguyen Thanh Le--as usual, not publicized in Hanoi's media--quoted him as complaining that "neither at plenary meetings nor at private meetings between representatives of the DRV and the United States" had the United States clearly stated an intention to withdraw troops and liquidate bases in South Vietnam. TASS also quoted him as mentioning a 26 July 1971 private meeting with Kissinger as showing that the United States uses the POW issue only for "propaganda purposes." According to the TASS account, Kissinger asserted that the DRV should not expect the United States to agree to a settlement solely for the purpose of solving the POW question. TASS also cited Le as having "flatly rejected" allegations that the PRG had had contacts with representatives of the Saigon regime.

The dispatch from Hanoi in PRAVDA on 28 January alluded to the secret talks in criticizing the United States for having ignored the PRG's seven points. The dispatch noted that the President only now has announced counterproposals that were made "secretly" about three months ago.

On 31 January TASS promptly reported the Paris press conference at which the DRV delegation circulated a communique censuring the U.S. Government for unilaterally revealing the contents of the secret meetings. While reporting the DRV's nine-point plan and noting that the delegation had decided to publish the documents turned over during the private meetings, TASS did not mention either the U.S. eight points or the exchange of letters regarding the canceled November secret meeting.

ATTACKS ON        In its reaction to the President's proposal  
PEKING            Moscow has again taken the occasion to attack Peking's "collaborationist" policies. Several commentaries, including a dispatch in PRAVDA on 28 January, have cited a Karnow article in the Washington POST as noting that the President disclosed his peace plan shortly before his trip to Peking and that the Chinese have revealed a tolerant attitude toward the President's policies.

It has been left to the purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress to carry this line on Sino-U.S. collusion the furthest. In broadcasts to the Chinese on 29 and 31 January, Radio Peace and Progress went so far as to charge that Washington gave the Peking leaders "advance notice" not only of the bombings of North Vietnam but also of the eight-point plan.

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## HANOI DENIES RUMORED SECRET CONTACTS WITH PHNOM PENH

Western reports that Phnom Penh and Hanoi have engaged in indirect approaches to one another drew a sharp and somewhat defensive denial from the North Vietnamese. A DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on 1 February termed reports that there have been secret contacts concerning "a separate peace plan in Cambodia" a "deceitful trick" of the United States and the Phnom Penh "puppets" to mislead the public, cover up U.S. aggression in Cambodia, "divide the Indochinese countries," and "divide the socialist countries"--an apparent allusion to the role reputedly played by the Soviets in facilitating the contacts. Dismissing the "fabricated" reports, the statement reaffirmed that the DRV recognizes the Sihanouk government (RGNU) as the "sole, legal, and authentic government of Cambodia" and that the Phnom Penh "puppet administration" is a U.S. lackey which "does not represent anyone."

The notion of a "separate peace" for Cambodia was also denounced in a 2 February NHAN DAN Commentator article on the DRV-U.S. secret talks disclosed by President Nixon on 25 January. As soon as these secret talks were divulged, NHAN DAN said, the Americans and their "puppets" in Phnom Penh claimed that contacts had been established between Phnom Penh and the DRV on a "separate peace for Cambodia"--a "nonsensical" fabrication that was "obviously linked" with the "dark designs and treacherous" attitude displayed by the United States in making the U.S.-DRV talks public.

RGNU ON U.S. "PLOTS"      An ambiguous statement from "the interior part of the RGNU" dated 26 January, broadcast by the FUNK radio the next day, had complained vaguely of "diplomatic" trickery with respect to Cambodia on the part of the Nixon Administration. Signed by the three RGNU ministers and seven vice ministers said to be in the "liberated zone," the statement denounced "Nixon's new political and diplomatic plots." It alleged that in the face of military defeats in Cambodia the President has been forced to resort to "political and diplomatic tricks," having "lately" advanced various schemes "such as a cease-fire on the spot, peace talks, partition of Cambodia, settlement between the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak-Son Ngoc Thanh traitors and the FUNK, and many other formulas." It also said the President is "launching deceptive activities abroad, while in Phnom Penh Ambassador Swank and the traitors are engaging in the same talks."

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It concluded with the report that "at a special meeting in the liberated zone, the ministers of the interior part of the RGNU, leading FUNK cadres, and leading cadres of the CPNLAF" reiterated their determination to continue the struggle without compromise, overthrow the Phnom Penh regime, and build a new Cambodia.

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### DRV SPOKESMAN CONDEMNS U.S. STRIKES; PRESS URGES VIGILANCE

The DRV Foreign Ministry on 2 February promptly scored U.S. strikes against the North on 31 January and 1 February in a routine-level spokesman's statement. Earlier strikes were "sternly condemned" by the foreign ministry in a spokesman's statement on 31 January.

The 2 February statement charged that on 31 January and 1 February U.S. planes "continuously bombed and strafed a certain number of populated areas belonging to Quang Binh Province." (The U.S. Command in Saigon on the 1st reported at least seven strikes against North Vietnam that day and five on 31 January--which were said to range up to 50 miles north of the northern edge of the demilitarized zone.)

The statement also charged that "during the same period" U.S. planes, including B-52's, bombed Huong Lap village and U.S. artillery "from positions south of the DMZ" attacked Vinh Son and Vinh Giang villages, which it said "are situated inside the demilitarized zone and belong to DRV territory." The earlier statement on the 31st had also claimed that the same three villages were hit--Huong Lap by planes, including B-52's, and Vinh Son and Vinh Giang by artillery--from 23 to 30 January. The 31 January statement also said artillery from U.S. ships was used against the latter two villages.

In addition, the 31 January protest said that on the 28th U.S. planes fired rockets at Xuan Tho village, Trieu Son district, Thanh Hoa Province,\* and that on the 30th U.S. planes "bombed or strafed a number of populated areas in Le Thuy district, Quang Binh Province." The statement asserted that the strikes "inflicted losses in human lives and property," but went on routinely to condemn "these acts of war" and demand an end to all "gross encroachments" on DRV sovereignty and security.

The 2 February spokesman's statement condemned the "acts of war" and added that these "serious acts" constitute "a brazen challenge to peace- and justice-loving public opinion in the world and have further laid bare the deceitful peace arguments of the Nixon Administration."

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\* The U.S. Command on the 29th said that on the previous day, a U.S. jet-fighter attacked a radar site "within 75 miles of Hanoi."

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VIGILANCE Continuing Hanoi propaganda urging the DRV population to be more vigilant includes editorials in both the party paper NHAN DAN and the army organ QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 27th. Both state that despite losses the United States remains "very stubborn and bellicose," and NHAN DAN goes on to predict openly that "before suffering total defeat the U.S. aggressors will concoct many new, sinister schemes and commit new crimes against the northern part of our country." Both papers urge the people and armed forces to heighten vigilance and remain alert. And QUAN DOI NHAN DAN warns: "Not only do we have to stand ready to cope with U.S. air, naval, and artillery forces but we must also be prepared to exterminate all enemy rangers and spies. At the same time, it is necessary that we frustrate every one of the enemy's psychological warfare tricks and espionage acts."

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### PRG COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETS, ADOPTS POLICIES ON DEFECTORS

Liberation Radio revealed on 28 January that the PRG Council of Ministers had met for six days "early in January" in a "liberated area" to review the situation in the past year and set forth trends and tasks for the coming year. A similar agenda was said to have been followed at Council meetings in February 1971 and January 1970.\* The recent meeting, chaired by PRG President Huynh Tan Phat, reportedly approved a communique on the session and on the Council's views--released on the 28th--and a statement "on the fact that the Americans and Thieu have forced our people's sons and brothers to take up fighting as mercenaries and die in the place of the U.S. aggressors." This appears to be the PRG statement, publicized in Vietnamese communist media on the 25th, which spelled out 10 policies defining the treatment of Saigon army and government personnel, stressing that they and their families should oppose the Thieu regime to gain favor with the "revolutionary administration."

The Council of Ministers' communique reiterates the optimistic communist appraisal of developments in the past year when it claims that communist forces inflicted "serious setbacks" on Vietnamization and won "great, strategically significant victories." In the political realm, it holds that the Thieu administration is unprecedentedly isolated and that the "contradictions" between "our southern people and the U.S.-puppet clique" have never been so acute. In the military sphere, it claims routinely that there has been a shift in the balance of forces to the disadvantage of the allies and that "our South Vietnamese people's fight now has many favorable opportunities to advance toward even greater new victories."

The "tasks" spelled out in the communique are more like those endorsed by the 1970 Council of Ministers session than those approved at last year's meeting. They include strengthening of the leadership of the "revolutionary administration" and motivating the army and people to develop the military, political, and diplomatic struggle "while coordinating closely with the brotherly Cambodian and Lao armed forces and people in winning the greatest victories aimed at dooming the U.S."

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\* The 1971 session of the Council of Ministers is discussed in the 24 February 1971 TRENDS, page 20. The 1970 meeting is reviewed in the 4 February 1970 TRENDS, page 12.

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imperialists' Vietnamization policy and at advancing toward complete victory." The tasks listed by the Council's meeting last February, unlike this year's and those of 1970, made no mention of the "revolutionary administration" and did not specifically call for efforts to achieve "complete victory."

10 POLICIES ON GVN PERSONNEL      The 10-point PRG statement of policies toward elements associated with the Saigon government was dated 21 January by some Hanoi broadcasts and was made public, three days before the announcement of the Council of Ministers meeting, at a 25 January press conference held by the PRG representation in Hanoi. It was broadcast repeatedly by Hanoi and Front media beginning on the 25th and was welcomed in Liberation Radio comment and by articles in the 26 January issues of NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN.

Previous PRG Council of Ministers meetings have not issued statements of this kind, but the substance of the statement is in line with past NFLSV/PRG promises of leniency toward GVN soldiers and officials who defect or cooperate. Such a promise was briefly stated in the 10-point program of the NFLSV released in February 1961, two months after the Front's creation. The Front's lengthy August 1967 program elaborated the communists' position on this question and was cited by Nguyen Huu Tho in February 1968 in an appeal at the start of the Tet offensive for GVN army and government personnel to defect to the Front. And on 20 April 1968, Liberation Radio broadcast a further statement of policy which provided more detail along lines repeated in the current one.

The April 1968 statement, claiming that the "struggle" had reached a period of "constant offensive and comprehensive uprising" paving the way for "final success," said that the policies were aimed at "creating favorable conditions" for individuals in the Saigon government and army who wished to "choose the correct path" in "these extremely glorious, decisive historic hours and minutes." The general outline of the communists' policy of encouraging defectors was again authoritatively endorsed in the PRG's 10 June 1969 program of action.

While the release of the current policy statement may have been timed to coordinate with a planned communist offensive in the near future, it is noteworthy that the statement stresses the long-term goal of undermining GVN conscription efforts and

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other aspects of Vietnamization. Thus, while the April 1968 statement dwelt on the treatment to be given officers and troops who "rise up to stage a coup d'etat, desert, disobey orders," and so forth, the current statement leads off with an exposition of policies toward those who help undermine Vietnamization. It notes, for example, benefits which will accrue to individuals who shelter youths from the draft, persuade Saigon soldiers to desert, or indicate their opposition to participation in popular defense organizations and to the incorporation of these forces into the regular army.

Like the April 1968 statement, the current one goes on to specify policies toward Saigon government and army personnel who cooperate to one degree or another. For example, it repeats the promise that officers who "rise up in revolt" will keep their ranks and be assigned appropriate posts. Government functionaries who "rise up" to help "topple" the Thieu regime are also promised "appropriate posts," where in 1968 the Front promised more vaguely that such officials would be "awarded and well considered."

The communists' desire to unify and encourage the backing of as many elements as possible in South Vietnam--apparent in propaganda relating the 10-point statement to the PRG's policy of "national concord"--apparently motivated the statement's policy covering families of GVN military personnel. The statement assures families whose relatives have been "forced" into the Saigon armed forces that they will be considered "victims of the U.S. imperialists' aggressive policy" and will not be discriminated against. No such promise was made in the 1968 statement. The significance of this policy is pointed up in a 28 January Liberation Radio commentary which scores the Saigon government for attempting to "turn millions of families, whose relatives have been drafted, into a force supporting its country-grabbing and county-selling designs."

The need for unity expressed in the 10-point statement is in line with remarks in NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho's 18 December speech marking the anniversary of the Front. He called for unified action, appealing to "all leaders of political, social, and religious forces, personalities and Vietnamese patriots of all trends and political tendencies--including those who for one reason or another are still in the puppet army and administration." And he maintained that

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"among the Vietnamese people, except for a handful of warlike and dictatorial people in the Thieu clique, everything can be discussed and settled on the basis of national concord, so that the war may soon be ended and peace restored . . . ."

In the same vein, an 8 January Liberation Radio commentary showed sensitivity to GVN efforts to win over the people when it scored Saigon's efforts to "bind over the majority of our people to them with economic or political ties." The commentary referred to communist policies of leniency toward those leaving the ranks of the "enemy" and recalled the examples of formerly anticommunist figures who later participated in the North Vietnamese regime--current DRV Vice Minister Phan Ke Toai and former DRV Minister of Interior Huynh Thuc Khang, who died in 1947.

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## WARSAW PACT MEETING

### DECLARATION ON EUROPEAN SECURITY ENDORSES TROOP REDUCTIONS

The Declaration on Peace, Security, and Cooperation in Europe, released at the end of a 25-26 January meeting in Prague of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee, represents the first endorsement by the full Pact membership of the Brezhnev proposal last March for the opening of talks on force and armaments reductions in Europe.\* Additionally, the declaration outlines seven "principles and goals" to guide the participants in a European security conference. But otherwise it is unexceptional. It routinely assails those "forces" in Europe opposing a conference, at the same time citing the recent positive factors in Europe conducive to the convening of a conference in 1972 to be attended by "all European states," the United States, and Canada. It endorses the November 1970 Finnish proposal for the opening of multilateral preparatory consultations and reaffirms the decision of the Pact members to appoint plenipotentiaries to take part in these consultations in Helsinki.

FORCE, ARMAMENTS      Without attributing the proposal to Brezhnev,  
REDUCTIONS              the declaration declares that achieving  
                                 agreement on the reduction of armed forces  
and armaments in Europe would help to strengthen security on the  
continent. It specifies -- as Brezhnev did in speeches on 14 May  
and 11 June when he elaborated on the proposal -- that these  
reductions could involve both foreign and national troops. The  
declaration goes on to note that the question ought to be solved  
in "such a manner as not to be to the detriment of the countries  
taking part," a formulation which was introduced in the  
18 September 1971 communique following Chancellor Brandt's  
meeting with Brezhnev in the Crimea and which has appeared  
in subsequent Soviet communiqués with NATO members.

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\* Brezhnev in his 30 March report to the 24th CPSU Congress had called for force and armaments cuts in areas where armed confrontation is especially dangerous, "primarily in central Europe." Subsequent propaganda -- both elite and routine -- has been inconsistent in identifying the area where cuts should be made, at times specifying "central Europe," at other times referring only to "Europe," the area mentioned in the current declaration. For further background, see the TRENDS for 14 October 1971, pages 15-16.

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This formulation seemingly keeps open the possibility of asymmetrical force reductions, an idea long promoted by NATO. But a participant in the commentators' roundtable show broadcast in the Moscow domestic service on 30 January flatly rejected this notion. According to the commentator, "there can be no question" of an "asymmetric approach to the solution of this matter, that is, one in which the armed forces of the socialist countries would be reduced to a considerably greater degree than the armed forces of the NATO countries and the neutrals."

In keeping with the bulk of Moscow propaganda since March, the declaration does not link the proposed talks to the European security conference, noting only that an "appropriate agreement could be reached on the way of conducting talks on this question." A commentator in the 30 January roundtable show was more specific in dismissing the idea that the force reduction issue could be considered at a European security conference. Responding to another participant's question, he said that the matter of "military detente is a very large, separate question. It requires separate study. It would not be advisable to add it to the all-European conference, at the center of which will be political steps and questions of cooperation."

Atypically, Premier Kosygin in a 3 December 1971 speech in Copenhagen had observed that "reduction of armed forces and armaments" was one of the questions which the USSR and its allies hope to solve at a European security conference. And at a 7 December joint press conference in Oslo with Norwegian Prime Minister Bratteli -- reported in NEW TIMES (No. 51 for 1971) -- he told correspondents that if a European security conference were held soon, it could set up a body "where questions relating to the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe could be examined." Six months earlier, Deputy Foreign Minister Tsarapkin in a 1 June Copenhagen press conference -- reported by Budapest radio and AFP but not by Soviet media -- had responded in a similar fashion to a question. According to the AFP version, Tsarapkin said the troop-reduction question could be discussed by a working group at a European security conference. The Pact has been on record since the June 1970 Budapest meeting of foreign ministers as supporting the notion that the matter of "foreign" troop reductions in Europe could be discussed in a permanent body to be created by the participants in a European security conference.

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SEVEN PRINCIPLES      The declaration sets forth seven "principles and goals" to guide the participants in a European security conference. They are (a) inviolability of frontiers; (b) non-use of force or threatened force in resolving issues; (c) peaceful coexistence; (d) good-neighborly relations and cooperation; (e) mutually advantageous relations in fields ranging from economy and science to tourism and environmental control; (f) support for disarmament; and (g) support for the United Nations. The declaration further observes, along the lines of past Pact suggestions, that it would be possible to agree at the conference on means for developing reciprocally advantageous relations by European states "in every sphere," and that it would be expedient to establish at the conference a "permanent body" of "all the participating states concerned" which, after the conference, could continue work toward further cooperation.

The high-sounding seven principles, along with the suggestions on developing mutual relations in Europe and creating a permanent body, add little of substance to earlier Pact suggestions for an agenda. A meeting of Pact foreign ministers in Prague in October 1969 had proposed that a conference consider (a) the creation of security in Europe, and renunciation of the use of force and the threat of force in relations between European states; and (b) the widening of commercial, economic, technical, and scientific relations among the European states, serving the development of political cooperation based on equality of rights. In June 1970, the same foreign ministers at a meeting in Budapest expanded this proposed agenda to include consideration of problems of the human environment and cultural relations and the creation of a "permanent body."

#### COMMUNIQUE TREATS PACT UNITY, DEFENSE QUESTIONS IN LOW KEY

With the push for a European security conference under full sail, the communique issued at the close of the Warsaw Pact summit in Prague gave only brief attention to the unity and defense aspects of the Pact. It put the participating countries on record to the effect that they would "be ready to exert every effort in the future also in the interests of welding the stability of the socialist countries' unity" and would "repulse imperialist aggression and reaction." The atmosphere of the summit session was described as one of "fraternal friendship and cooperation."

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PRAVDA's editorial of the 28th typified propaganda on the cohesion in the media of the participating countries, focusing almost exclusively on the meeting's statements on Europe and Indochina and referring only briefly, in stereotyped fashion, to the Pact members' "cohesion" and resolve to "deal a rebuff to imperialist aggression and reaction."

Czechoslovak media, however, took the occasion to bring up the sensitive issue of the Pact's organizational unity and defense capability, with a talk on Prague domestic TV on 23 January underscoring the rationale for the organizational reforms adopted at the Warsaw Pact summit in Budapest in March 1969. TV commentator Vyborny charged that NATO has been trying since the 1950's to "weaken the internal links of the socialist countries" and recalled that "when socialism was threatened in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, military experts with tourist passports traveled to those countries to investigate the ground of the potentially weakened southern and south-eastern flanks of our alliance." In an atypically direct portrayal of the 1969 Pact organizational changes as resulting directly from the Czechoslovak episode, the commentator followed up this passage with the statement that "the armed forces had to be improved in order to truly become an instrument of the people's power in the Pact countries." He added that "this is why the share" of all the Pact member countries "in the joint command has increased."

Stressing that the Pact's annual military exercises are costly to the Soviet Union in particular, the Prague commentator stated that they are necessary because the joint armed forces are "the defender of the gains" of socialism as well as the guarantor of Moscow's current peace offensive. A similar theme was played in an article by Lecturer Col. Samoylenko, supplied by NOVOSTI, published in the Sofia military daily NARODNA ARMIYA on 25 January. This article dwelt on the Pact's role as a defensive organization embodying the international duties and national interests of its members.

**BACKGROUND** While Soviet bloc propaganda on the major annual maneuvers has continued to underscore the organizational unity and defensive strength of the Pact during the past two years, routine commentaries on the Pact have focused largely on its role in the context of European security. The cursory attention given unity and defense in the latest Pact summit communique is in line with the treatment accorded these aspects in the communique on the Political Consultative Committee

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meetings of August and December 1970, both of which were pre-occupied with problems of Germany and Europe.

Thus the communique on the August 1970 meeting in Moscow said nothing about organizational matters and merely registered a general conviction that "the strengthening of fraternal ties and all-round cooperation between the socialist countries is a guarantee of safeguarding peace and European security." That meeting was held, according to the communique, in a spirit of "complete accord, friendship, and cooperation." The communique on the December 1970 meeting, held in East Berlin, entirely ignored the problems of Pact unity and defense; it recorded an atmosphere of "friendship, fraternal cooperation, and full unanimity."

In the 1968-69 period culminating in the March 1969 Pact summit meeting in Budapest, commentaries on the Pact had reflected the stresses resulting from the Czechoslovak episode in highlighting the solidarity of the member countries against disruptive "imperialist" intrigues. The communique on the March 1969 session dwelt at length on the organizational changes, including the setting up of a committee of defense ministers and increasing the representation of the non-Soviet member states in the Pact joint command.

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## YUGOSLAVIA

## PARTY TIGHTENS DISCIPLINE, ESCHEWS "COMMAND" ROLE

The Second Conference of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), which met from 25 to 27 January, produced no surprises in its moves to strengthen the party's hand in dealing with the country's persistent political and economic problems. In an attempt to reduce republican factionalism and speed decision-making at the party's highest levels, the party Presidium voted to reduce its Executive Bureau from 14 members to eight. Stane Dolanc, a Slovene of centrist persuasions, was elected by the conference to serve as Executive Bureau secretary. The conference also decided to greatly reduce the size of basic party organs, as well as to recruit considerably more workers into the party ranks and to give them more say in decision-making.

While both the conference decisions and the remarks to the meeting by Tito indicated that the crackdown against nationalist and other dissident elements will continue, both reaffirmed the continuing validity of Yugoslavia's self-management principles. And Tito, with both domestic and foreign audiences evidently in mind, insisted defensively that the party is not reverting to its earlier pervasive "command" role in Yugoslav society.

**ACTION PROGRAM** The conference "Action Program," publicized in the media on the 28th, emerges as a generally moderate document which outlines the party's tasks for restoring party discipline, curbing nationalism, and stabilizing the economy. Making the case for tighter party control, the document attributes the rise of nationalism and the country's "chronic economic instability" in large measure to the party's laxity in "underestimating the class enemy." Hewing to a centrist position, it portrays the self-management forces as opposing "secessionist, nationalist" elements on one side and "bureaucratic, statist" forces on the other. Indicating that the crackdown on such elements will continue, the party program calls on officials to act promptly to expose any such manifestations and to "expel" any of their advocates from the party ranks.

Concurrently, the party program cites the need for "intensified and more resolute struggle for the development of self-management, in which the working class should play the decisive role." In this connection, it calls for restructuring the league by recruiting many more workers into its ranks and giving them more say in decision-making--a policy that would limit the role of bureaucrats.

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In the wake of the recent events in Croatia, the program predictably reaffirms that the league will remain the "sole" political organization in Yugoslavia and insists that democratic centralism will be observed from the basic organizations to the league organs. The conference program leaves it to lower party organs to fix deadlines for implementation of party tasks, specifying that "concrete plans of action" must be worked out by every basic-level organization.

**TITO SPEECH** In his concluding address to the conference on the 27th, Tito reaffirmed the action program's call for party discipline and ideological alertness to defeat the class enemy and to solve the country's economic and political woes. But he seemed to go out of his way to play down the idea that the party is in crisis or that the new reforms signal a return to old style Stalinist methods. Tito acknowledged that the party has "weaknesses," but he insisted that "despite them, there is no crisis in the League of Communists."

Tito responded indirectly to apprehensions aroused by his crack-down on nationalist elements in Croatia, vigorously denying that Yugoslavia is "some kind of dictatorship and that the people are afraid." He added: "We have not turned democracy backward, into the past, into some sort of dogmatic waters, or turned it over to some sort of firm hand." Arguing that the LCY has not departed from the course of self-management, he explained that the conference "did not introduce anything new in our program . . . . It did not introduce a rule that the League of Communists will now issue commands in enterprises, offices, institutions, and so forth; there will be none of that." Defensively claiming that democratic centralism has assumed a special character in Yugoslavia, Tito nevertheless went on to insist that the concept is "valid" and must be observed by the party faithful.

In an obvious effort to allay public apprehension over his earlier threats to use the army to quell Croatian nationalism, Tito commented gratuitously that the party and "not the army should be the guardian of our revolution." The army's task, he added, "is to defend our borders." Turning more specifically to the events in Croatia, he praised the new republic leadership for its handling of the problem but pointedly warned them against allowing "any witch hunts." Those who erred against the party, he said, must be given party punishment up to expulsion; and those who are proven to be criminally involved through investigation must be punished by the courts.

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Against the background of demands by Croatian veterans groups for the use of harsher methods against the deposed Croatian leadership, Tito promised that those expelled from the party (the Croatian leaders merely resigned from office and retain their party membership) would not be allowed to continue their nationalist activities and would be dealt with more harshly if they attempted to do so. But he took the veterans to task for expressing "differing views on certain matters" and for creating ill-feelings among the veterans outside the party organizations.

Tito returned to a favorite theme--the ideological erosion among youth--in calling for a removal from their posts of "those who are spoiling our youth." Noting that in the past similar calls have gone in "in one ear and out the other," he said "now we have the upper hand and will take measures."

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## MIDDLE EAST

### USSR MARKS TIME ON MIDEAST, AVOIDS PUBLICIZING AS-SADAT VISIT

Moscow gave no advance publicity to as-Sadat's visit to Moscow once the impending visit had been announced by the Egyptian president in a speech on 25 January, merely reporting his arrival in Moscow on 2 February. Propaganda had appeared to lay the groundwork for the visit, however, with press and radio comment extolling Soviet-Egyptian friendship and cooperation and underscoring the USSR's great contributions to Cairo's economic development and "defense capability."

A low volume of Soviet propaganda on the Middle East continues to criticize the United States for further armaments deliveries and military production assistance to Israel. While routinely accusing the United States of thus encouraging Israeli "aggression," a Fedorov commentary broadcast in English to North America on the 30th revived the defensive argument that Soviet military assistance to Egypt and other Arab states, on the other hand, represents help to victims of aggression. Fedorov also promoted Moscow's "detailed plan for a peace settlement," briefly noting some aspects of the Soviet proposals and pointing out that Israel's security, as well as that of the Arab states, would be guaranteed by the big powers. (This is apparently the first propaganda reference to the Soviet plan since Primakov's 5 January PRAVDA discussion and that by Usvatov in NEW TIMES No. 52 of 1971.\*)

A domestic service commentary by Viktor Aleksandrov on the 1st denounced new U.S. "steps that encourage Israel to sabotage a political settlement," ticking off examples of military cooperation and also charging that the United States and Israel "act as one" in engaging in complex maneuvers to wreck Egyptian diplomatic initiatives. Aleksandrov asserted that if "the so-called interim settlement" involving the Suez Canal took into account the interests of both sides and was an integral part of a general settlement, it "would have been the first step" in establishing a just peace in the region.

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\* The German-language version of NEW TIMES, as well as the Russian, called in routine fashion for Israeli withdrawal from the "extensive" Arab lands seized by Israel, while the English-language version atypically spoke of Israeli withdrawal from "the sizeable part" of Arab territories captured in 1967. See the 19 January TRENDS, page 39.

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Leveling a further accusation against the United States and Israeli, an article in SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA by Marshov, reported by TASS on the 2d, claimed that U.S. and Israeli "ruling circles" were "harboring plans of destroying Egypt," and that a group of experts had arrived in Israel from the United States "to develop a special explosive device to destroy the Aswan dam and other industrial centers."

AS-SADAT TO MOSCOW      Avoiding advance publicity for President as-Sadat's visit to Moscow, brief Soviet reports on his 25 January speech, in which he dealt with the "battle decision" and the student situation, again failed to acknowledge his references to "highest-level contacts" with the Soviet Union, which he had also mentioned in his 13 January address. Nor did the accounts of the speech on the 25th pick up as-Sadat's statement that these contacts would be concluded with a visit by him to Moscow. Predictably, TASS' report on the 27th did point out that the Egyptian president condemned the U.S. policy of giving military and economic support to Israel, and cited him as stressing that the USSR is friendly to Egypt and is its "main ally in the struggle against the Israeli aggression."

Subsequently, Cairo media have reported that preparations were being made for a three-day visit by as-Sadat to Moscow as well as plans to visit Yugoslavia, Syria, and Libya en route home. AL-AHRAM on the 2d, according to Cairo radio's press review, said the president must be back in Cairo before 11 February "for an appointment" with Bulgarian Chairman Todor Zhivkov.\* The Cairo reports characterized the Moscow agenda as dealing with "the new dimensions of the battle" and as-Sadat himself said on the 25th that the Egyptians and Soviets must discuss the change in the balance of power and "there must be new preparations--preparations in simple arithmetic." Declaring that "I must revise my calculations because the decision is ours," as-Sadat went on to add that "I must go back to this friend, talk with him, and tell him to come and revise calculations with me once more." And at another point he called the Soviet Union "the only friend supporting us and supplying us with arms and with whom we must coordinate."

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\* Zhivkov's visit was apparently first scheduled for January: AL-AHRAM had reported on 13 January that the Bulgarian leader would be paying an official visit to Egypt "next week." Zhivkov arrived in Damascus on 1 February for an official visit to Syria.

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In a speech to troops in Aswan on 30 January, reported by the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) on the 1st, as-Sadat explained last year's "misunderstanding with the USSR" because of events in Sudan and "because men of the centers of power here went to the Russians and told them Anwar as-Sadat had sold out the country to the Americans." The president asserted that during his Moscow talks last October "we settled our differences" and "we agreed on arms." A 1 February AL-AHRAM account of this speech was noted by TASS that day. The paper quoted the president, TASS said, as declaring that a decision to resume the armed struggle has been taken and the battle will be fought. "However," TASS added, as-Sadat emphasized that it is one thing to take a decision on a battle and another thing to start a battle.

#### MOSCOW CONVEYS DISAPPROVAL OF STUDENT UNREST IN EGYPT

Moscow has only briefly and indirectly indicated its disapproval of the student meetings, sit-ins, and demonstrations which began on the 17th following the appointment of the new 'Aziz Sidqi government. (According to Arab and Western press accounts, the students protested "negative" government policies, attacked Israel and the United States, and also censured the Soviet Union.\*) TASS on the 27th summed up in two paragraphs as-Sadat's long discussion of the student actions in his 25 January speech, noting that he said some tendencies represented in the student movement were trying to undermine the domestic front, and that security forces had uncovered a plan showing that the student actions had been inspired by forces outside the higher education establishments.

A Moscow Arabic-language commentary on the 25th, pegged to Prime Minister 'Aziz Sidqi's 23 January policy statement, touched indirectly on the student problem in remarking that "special zeal and a patriotic upsurge" are evident among the youths of Egypt and other Arab countries. The broadcast noted that Sidqi praised this zeal and urged the youths "to shift their legitimate anxiety" about the country's destiny to practical activities. Moscow added the cautionary note that "zeal alone is not sufficient" at a time when the enemy is using every

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\* A 29 January article appearing in both the Lebanese CP weekly AL-AKHBAR and the party daily AN-NIDA, and reproduced by the Beirut independent paper AN-NAHAR the following day, claimed that rightwing forces involved in the student movement called for more arms from the USSR, in effect blaming the Soviet Union for not enabling Egypt "to finally decide the issue."

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means and "the most modern arms," and it prescribed "knowledge and enlightened active work" to insure success of the Arab cause.

HUNGARIAN COMMENT The Hungarian party organ NEPSZABADSAG provides the only available communist analysis thus far of the governmental reorganization in Egypt, the adoption of a "confrontation" policy, and student expressions of dissent. The author of the 26 January article, Sandor Bocz, rebuked as-Sadat for "raising exaggerated expectations" that 1971 would be the year of decision for a political or military settlement of the Middle East crisis. He indicated that the new slogan of raising the domestic front to the level of the military one was long overdue, and regarded the slogan as incorporating a tacit realization, "tantamount to self-criticism," that insufficient attention had been paid to domestic mobilization. There are "realistic motives" for giving priority to extensive preparation of the country, he said, adding that this task would require a "prolonged period of time." Ignoring as-Sadat's reiterations that the "battle decision" has been taken, Bocz said the main student differences with the leadership arose over as-Sadat's continued support of a Middle East political settlement based on Security Council Resolution 242. "Impatient and extremist" students, he said, regarded military action as the only possible solution and failed to understand the need to prepare the country. Bocz commented that the students could hardly be expected to understand and accept the domestic focus of the "confrontation policy" which "creates the impression that a military settlement of the crisis has been removed from the agenda." He observed that the "technocrat" composition of the new government for the most part confirmed the impression of turning inward. Conceding that the situation was "complicated and contradictory," Bocz commented that the new government must face difficulties and obstacles which weaken the country's resistance and might even jeopardize the military tasks of the armed forces.

#### SOVIET MISSION IN TEL AVIV: USSR, PRC EXCHANGE BARBS ON ISRAEL

Comment relating to the 18-28 January World Zionist Congress in Israel and the "nonexistent question" of Soviet Jews, after a buildup to two percent of total broadcast comment in the week ending 23 January, has been markedly curtailed. Coincidentally, a three-man delegation from the USSR Association for Friendship and Cultural Links with Foreign Countries has been visiting Israel. Reporting the group's arrival on 20 January, Jerusalem radio pointed out that it was the first official delegation from the Soviet Union to arrive in Israel since the June 1967 war. A Hebrew-language broadcast of Moscow's "unofficial" Radio

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Peace and Progress on the 24th provides the only available Soviet comment on the visit. Noting that the Soviet delegation attended a conference "for friendship and improving relations with the USSR," the broadcast said the conference communique called for an improvement in Israeli-Soviet relations which would bring nearer the establishment of a just and stable peace between Israel and its neighbors. The communique, it added, appealed to every person in Israel who has good will and political consciousness to "reject the anti-Soviet slander and do everything to improve" Israeli-Soviet relations. Ostensibly still citing the communique, Radio Peace and Progress declared that wider Israeli circles are reaching the conclusion that "Israel's interests demand an improvement in relations with the USSR." It added that the arrival of the Soviet delegation "is an expression of good will from the USSR regarding the Israeli nation and the forces of peace in Israel." There is, of course, no Soviet propaganda acknowledgment of Israeli Prime Minister Meir's remark, in a 29 January radio interview, that "we would like" resumption of diplomatic relations and that it "might in fact take place." Mrs. Meir saw no link between the issues of immigration and diplomatic relations; she said either could occur without the other but "we would like to have both."

Peking, in a 31 January PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on India and Pakistan, lambasted the "Soviet revisionists" for having "flagrantly sent a so-called 'good will' delegation to Israel." Since they are capable of such things, PEOPLE'S DAILY rhetorically inquired, how could they be expected to support the Palestinian and other Arab peoples' struggle against the "U.S.-Israeli aggressors"? Moscow, for its part, continues to play up foreign press reports of "backstage intrigues" and contacts between Tel Aviv and Peking.\* Most recently, a Sergeyev commentary broadcast in Arabic on 24 January, and three days earlier in Mandarin, cited the London OBSERVER as saying that China had proposed to Israel that diplomatic relations be established. Sergeyev also claimed that according to "U.S. press" reports, Foreign Minister Eban met with Peking's UN delegates while in New York.

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\* Earlier Soviet treatment of reported Israeli-Chinese contacts is discussed in the 11 August 1971 TRENDS, pages 24-25.

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## CHINA INTERNAL AFFAIRS

## ANOTHER PROVINCE, SHANSI, HOLDS ITS SECOND PARTY PLENUM

On 30 January the Taiyuan radio broadcast a lengthy account of the second plenum of the Shansi Provincial CCP Committee, an "enlarged" plenum held from 11 to 23 January. The first such provincial second plenum was convened by Hunan last December, approximately one year following formation of the new Hunan committee. Since then, several other provincial committees have seen their first anniversaries pass by without holding a second plenum. Shansi's plenum comes in less than a year, the committee having been established last April.

Unlike the Hunan plenum, which was attended only by committee members, at the Shansi meeting members were actually outnumbered by "principal responsible persons of regions, municipalities, counties, and districts." There are 97 members and alternates, while 218 persons participated in the enlarged plenum. Although only First Secretary Hsieh Chen-hua, who delivered a report, was named in the radio account of the plenum, the other committee secretaries have all made public appearances as recently as December.

While the convening of an "enlarged" plenum could reflect leadership problems within the committee, the broadcast indicated that cadre education on economic policy may have been the principal factor. The radio report noted that the plenum "concentrated on discussing the party's rural economic policies," and listened to views of the party standing committee "on the division of labor in communes and on arrangements for agricultural production in 1972." The plenum also heard an explanation of the standing committee's resolution on speeding up agricultural mechanization. These themes, emphasizing moderation in distribution and accumulation policies, have been prominently featured recently in PRC media.

The plenum's presumptive discussion of more urgent political issues resulting from the Lin Piao purge was acknowledged only via references to such standard themes as the "one blow and three oppositions" campaign.

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## USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

### DNEPROPETROVSK OFFICIAL TAKES OVER TOP UKRAINE KOMSOMOL POST

The election of a new first secretary of the Ukrainian Komsomol on 27 January appears to constitute another setback for Ukrainian First Secretary Shelest. The new Komsomol secretary, A. M. Girenko, seems to be a protege of Shelest's Dnepropetrovsk rivals.

Formerly Komsomol first secretary in Dnepropetrovsk, Girenko had moved up to the post of second secretary of the Ukrainian Komsomol at that organization's congress in March 1970. Now, in less than two years, he has taken over the post of first secretary from A. S. Kapto, presumably with the assistance of his Dnepropetrovsk patrons, Ukrainian Premier Shcherbitskiy and the obkom first secretary, A. F. Vatchenko. It may also be assumed that the All-Union Komsomol first secretary, Ye. M. Tyazhelnikov--who is, like the Dnepropetrovsk leaders, a Brezhnev protege--played a major role in the selection of Girenko.

Direct party supervision over the Komsomol is shared by Ukrainian Second Secretary I. K. Lutak, who appears closer to Shelest, and Ukrainian cadres section chief A. A. Ulanov, who was Dnepropetrovsk city first secretary from 1966 to 1970. While the second secretary usually supervises important Komsomol plenums, Lutak was not present at this one, which was supervised by Tyazhelnikov and Ukrainian ideology secretary F. D. Ovcharenko.

Kapto, the retiring first secretary, did not depart under much of a cloud, for it was explained routinely that he had "transferred to party work." But he did not speak at the 27 January plenum, and perhaps defects in his leadership had been uncovered; the plenum was held to discuss "further improvement of ideological-educational work" of Komsomol organizations and the recent activities of the Komsomol's leadership. It was Girenko, not Kapto, who reported on improvement in ideological work, urging more "political vigilance" and "sharply" raising the question of "strengthening the struggle against antisocial acts among a certain part of the youth" (MOLOD UKRAINY, 28 January).

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The shortcomings in ideological work may be related to the unpublished Ukrainian Komsomol decree on the work of the Lvov oblast and Kiev city Komsomol organizations in teaching youth a Communist attitude toward work, adopted at a 20 September 1971 Komsomol plenum. Girenko subsequently attended a Lvov Komsomol plenum on this subject and supervised the election of a new oblast leader (MOLOD UKRAINY, 2 November). Girenko's successor as Ukrainian Komsomol second secretary is A. I. Korniyenko, who disappeared from the post of Kiev city Komsomol first secretary just before the decree on the Kiev city committee's work.

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